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Your Old Accounts Are A Security Risk — Here Is How To Clean Them Up

A friend of mine found out his email had been compromised not through his main Gmail, not through his bank, but through a gaming forum he'd signed up for in 2011 and completely forgotten about. The attackers used his recycled password from that dead account to get into his email. From there, they reset his PayPal password and drained it. The whole chain started with a website he hadn't visited in over a decade.

This is not a freak occurrence. It's the default outcome when you leave digital debris scattered across the internet.

The Problem Isn't the Accounts You Remember

Most people think about security in terms of their active accounts. But the real exposure lives in the graveyard — the food delivery app you used once, the news site you registered for to read one article, the startup that pivoted three times and probably sold its user database to cover costs.

According to Have I Been Pwned, over 14 billion accounts have been exposed in data breaches catalogued by their service alone. A meaningful portion of those are dormant accounts nobody is actively monitoring.

When those sites get breached — and they will — your email and password get bundled into a list and sold. If you reused that password anywhere, someone will try it.

Start by Finding What's Out There

Before you can delete anything, you need to know what exists. Open your email client and search for terms like "welcome to," "confirm your email," "verify your account," and "thank you for registering." You'll find accounts you haven't thought about in years.

Do this for every email address you've ever used. The old Hotmail address from high school counts. So does the one you made for a job that didn't work out.

A password manager with breach alerts — 1Password, Bitwarden, or even Apple's built-in Keychain — will flag if your credentials appear in known breaches. Run that audit now, not after something goes wrong.

The Counterintuitive Part Most Articles Skip

Here's what nobody tells you: deleting an account is often more dangerous than keeping it if you do it wrong.

When you request account deletion through a company's process, most platforms require you to log in first. That means you need to reset a forgotten password, which sends a link to your email. Fine. But some platforms — especially older ones — don't actually delete your data. They "deactivate" you. Your email, your password hash, your personal info are still sitting in their database.

The smarter move before deletion: change the email address on the account to a throwaway (something like a temp-mail address), change the password to a random 30-character string, and then request deletion. That way, even if the "deletion" is fake, the data on file is garbage.

The Actual Process, Step by Step

For accounts you want to close, JustDeleteMe is a directory that rates how difficult each service makes it to delete your account and links you directly to the deletion page. It removes the guesswork.

Work through accounts in priority order:

High-risk first: Any account that has your credit card, bank info, home address, or government ID. These are the ones that cause real financial damage if compromised.
Email-linked accounts second: Anything that can trigger a password reset to an email you still use.
Everything else: Forums, old social media, loyalty programs, streaming trials.

For accounts you want to keep but rarely use, enable two-factor authentication (2FA) and generate a unique password. A hardware key like a YubiKey is the strongest option for sensitive accounts. An authenticator app like Authy or Google Authenticator is a solid second choice. SMS-based 2FA is better than nothing but is the weakest of the three — SIM swapping attacks have made it unreliable.

What to Do About Breached Credentials Right Now

If your email shows up in a breach, don't just change the password on the breached site. Assume that password is permanently compromised and do a full audit of everywhere you used it.

According to the Identity Theft Resource Center's 2023 Annual Data Breach Report, data breach notices are being sent later and to fewer victims than in previous years, meaning you often can't rely on companies to tell you when your data has been exposed. The assumption should be that any account older than a few years, at a site that isn't a major platform, has probably already been caught in something.

Use a breach-checking tool, change passwords proactively, and stop treating old accounts as harmless.

One Honest Caveat

This process is tedious. Actually tedious. You will hit dead sites that no longer have functioning deletion flows, companies that send you in circles, and services that technically "comply" with your request while retaining your data in backups for years. The GDPR gives European users the right to erasure, but enforcement is inconsistent, and most Americans have no equivalent legal lever. You can reduce your exposure significantly — but you cannot scrub yourself from every database that already has your information. The goal is damage containment, not perfection.

Sources:

Have I Been Pwned
JustDeleteMe
Identity Theft Resource Center 2023 Annual Data Breach Report

How To Tell If That "Security Alert" Email Is Real Or A Trap

Your phone buzzes. It's an email from Apple — or at least, it says it is. Your account has been locked due to suspicious activity. There's a big red banner, an Apple logo, and a link to "verify your identity immediately." Your heart rate ticks up. You click.

That moment of mild panic is exactly what the person who sent that email was counting on.

This isn't hypothetical. Phishing emails that impersonate security alerts are among the most effective scams running right now, precisely because they weaponize the same instinct that good security advice has drilled into you: take threats seriously and act fast. The urgency is the trap.

The Trick Is That Legitimate Alerts Look Exactly Like Fake Ones

Here's the counterintuitive part most articles skip: real security alerts from Apple, Google, and your bank are often just as alarmist and visually dramatic as fake ones. Both use red banners. Both say "immediate action required." Both have polished logos. Assuming the scary-looking email is fake doesn't help you — and assuming the polished one is real will get you burned.

What actually separates them isn't how the email looks. It's where it's trying to send you.

Check the Link Before You Click Anything

Hover over any link in the email — don't click, just hover. On a phone, press and hold the link until a preview URL appears. Look at the actual domain, not the display text. The display text can say apple.com while the underlying link goes to apple-support-login.ru.

The real domain is the part immediately before the first single slash. So in secure.apple-verify.com/login, the domain is apple-verify.com — not Apple. Scammers are very good at making the fake domain sound plausible.

According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group, phishing attacks set a record in 2023 with over 1.3 million unique phishing sites detected in a single quarter — most of them impersonating financial and technology brands. The volume means attackers can register new lookalike domains faster than any blocklist can catch them.

The Sender Address Is Evidence, Not Proof

People are told to check the sender's email address, and you should — but it's not the whole story. A legitimate-looking address like security@appleid-alerts.com is still fake. And some sophisticated attacks can even spoof the display name to show no-reply@apple.com in your inbox while the actual sending address is something entirely different.

To see the real sending address in Gmail, click the three dots on the email and select "Show original." In Outlook, open the email properties. What you're looking for is the Return-Path header — that's where replies actually go and it's much harder to fake convincingly.

What Real Security Alerts Actually Do (and Don't Do)

Legitimate security alerts from major services follow a pattern worth memorizing:

They tell you what happened (a new sign-in from Chicago at 3pm)
They give you a way to say "that was me"
They do not ask for your password, payment info, or two-factor code

The moment an "alert" email asks you to enter anything — especially a verification code or your current password — stop. No real security system asks you to prove your identity by handing over the keys. That's not how authentication works. That's how credential theft works.

According to Google's Transparency Report on Safe Browsing, deceptive pages are identified at a rate of millions per week — and the most common pattern is fake login pages that collect credentials under the guise of account recovery.

The Safer Move: Go Around the Email Entirely

If an alert seems urgent and plausible, don't use any link or phone number in the email. Open a new browser tab and go directly to the service — type the address yourself or use your saved bookmark. Log in there. If something is genuinely wrong with your account, you'll see it after logging in through the real site.

This sounds obvious but almost nobody does it in the heat of the moment. The email is designed to be the path of least resistance. Going around it feels like more work when you're anxious, which is why it works so well as a bypass.

The same rule applies to phone numbers. If the email has a support number, don't call it. Look up the company's official support line from their website independently.

Two-Factor Codes Are Not a Safe Fallback

Many people think: "I have two-factor authentication on, so even if I get phished, I'm protected." This is dangerously wrong. Modern phishing kits operate as real-time proxies — you enter your credentials on the fake site, the attacker immediately uses them on the real site, triggers a 2FA request, which gets forwarded to you on the fake page, you enter it, and the attacker is in. The whole exchange takes under 30 seconds.

According to Proofpoint's State of the Phish 2023 report, 70% of organizations experienced at least one successful phishing attack, with MFA-bypass techniques growing substantially year over year. Two-factor helps. It's not a ceiling.

One Honest Limitation

None of this is foolproof, and you should know that going in. Phishing kits have become sophisticated enough that even security professionals get caught. If an attacker has done their homework — knows your bank, your name, and the type of account you have — their fake alert may contain accurate details that make it nearly impossible to distinguish on first read.

The tools here tilt the odds in your favor. They don't make you immune. The most realistic protection is to build the habit of slowing down the moment an email tries to create urgency — because that feeling of pressure is the product. Someone engineered it. It isn't the situation telling you to hurry. It's them.

Sources:

Anti-Phishing Working Group
Google Safe Browsing Transparency Report
Proofpoint State of the Phish 2023

Why Two-Factor Authentication Is Not As Safe As You Think

Two-Factor Authentication Won't Save You — Here's What Will

You probably set it up feeling smarter than the average person. An extra code sent to your phone, a little app that generates numbers every 30 seconds. You figured: even if someone gets my password, they still can't get in. That's the whole point, right?

That's exactly what an Uber contractor thought in September 2022. He had MFA enabled. Every login attempt triggered a push notification to his phone. He kept tapping "Deny." And the attacker — a teenager who bought stolen credentials off the dark web — just kept trying. Push after push after push. Forty notifications in thirty minutes. Then the attacker messaged the contractor on WhatsApp, pretending to be Uber IT support: "Just approve the next one and they'll stop." So he did. The attacker was inside Uber's entire corporate network within two hours.

Two-factor authentication didn't fail because it was bypassed technically. It failed because a tired human got harassed into opening the door himself.

The Part Nobody Tells You

Here's the uncomfortable truth: there's no such thing as a single layer of security. Two-factor authentication is a speed bump, not a wall. And the people trying to break into your accounts have already mapped every gap in it.

The biggest gap is SMS-based 2FA — the kind where a six-digit code gets texted to your phone. This is what most banks default to, what most people use, and what most people think is "secure enough." It isn't. According to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center, SIM swapping attacks — where criminals convince your mobile carrier to transfer your phone number to a SIM card they control — resulted in nearly $26 million in reported losses in 2024 alone. VikingCloud

Once they have your number, every SMS code you were counting on now goes to them. They don't need your phone. They need one cooperative or bribable customer service rep at your carrier.

How Your Phone Number Gets Stolen Without Touching Your Phone

The attack is brutally simple. Someone collects details about you — your name, address, last four of your Social Security number, maybe your carrier account PIN — through a data breach, a phishing email, or just combing through your social media. Then they call your mobile carrier, pretend to be you, and say they lost their phone.

A Princeton study found that researchers could successfully port a number at major North American prepaid telecom companies by answering just one security question correctly Phishlabs — information that's frequently already available from previous breaches or public records.

Your carrier deactivates your SIM. Their SIM activates with your number. Your phone shows "No Service." And you have maybe ten minutes before they're into your email, your bank, your crypto wallet — anything that can be reset via a text message.

The counterintuitive part: it doesn't matter whether those sites use SMS 2FA. If your email password can be reset through a text to your phone number, every account tied to that email is now accessible. One pivot point cascades everywhere.

The Attack That Doesn't Even Need Your Password

SIM swapping requires some setup. The other dominant bypass technique requires almost none.

It's called MFA fatigue, or push bombing. The attacker already has your username and password — not difficult, given that billions of credentials are sitting in breach databases available on the dark web. They log in repeatedly, triggering push notification after push notification on your phone. They do it at 11pm. At 2am. During your lunch break.

Most people, after 20 or 30 notifications, either assume it's a glitch and approve one to make it stop, or get socially engineered by someone calling them pretending to be tech support. According to a 2022 State of Passwordless Security report, this style of attack increased 33% year over year — and that data was collected before the Lapsus$ group made push bombing a mainstream tactic. Hypr

This isn't a niche attack. Microsoft, Cisco, Cloudflare, MGM Resorts — all hit with variations of this technique. The common thread isn't weak technology. It's exhausted people.

What Actually Works

The good news is that the fix is genuinely more secure, not just differently inconvenient.

Ditch SMS codes entirely. Replace them with an authenticator app — Google Authenticator, Authy, or Microsoft Authenticator. These apps generate codes locally on your device that never travel over any network. A SIM swap can't intercept them because there's no text to intercept.

Go further with a hardware key. Devices like a YubiKey plug into your computer's USB port or tap against your phone via NFC. You physically have to touch the device to authenticate. No push notification to bomb, no SMS to intercept, no code to phish. Cloudflare survived the same attack that breached Uber specifically because they'd already deployed hardware keys — the attacker's approved push notification produced nothing.

Lock your carrier account down. Call your mobile provider and set a port freeze or a number lock. Some carriers call it a "SIM lock" or "account takeover protection." This means your number cannot be transferred without an in-person visit to a store with a photo ID. T-Mobile, Verizon, and AT&T all offer some version of this — you just have to request it.

Use a unique email for security-critical accounts. Your banking email should not be the same address you use for newsletters, shopping, or anything that's likely been in a breach. A dedicated address that you never give out reduces your attack surface significantly.

Know what an attack feels like. If you suddenly get a flood of MFA push notifications you didn't initiate, that's not a glitch — someone has your password and is trying to get in. Don't approve anything. Change your password immediately (from a different device if possible), then report it to your account's security team.

The One Thing That Surprises People

Most articles assume you're the target of an opportunistic attacker running automated scripts. The scarier truth is that SIM swapping attacks are often deeply personal and manually researched.

In 2018, crypto investor Michael Terpin had $23.8 million stolen through SIM swapping by attackers who specifically targeted him after he publicly discussed his cryptocurrency holdings. Wikipedia The attackers spent time learning about him before making a single phone call.

If you talk about money, crypto, or financial assets publicly online, you're advertising to a very specific category of criminal. The attack starts long before the phone call to your carrier.

The Honest Limitation

Here's where I won't lie to you: even hardware keys can be circumvented if an attacker gains physical access to your device, or if a service falls back to SMS when you claim to have lost your key. That fallback option — built into most platforms to avoid locking users out permanently — is often the easiest path in. No security system is closed-ended. What you're doing is making yourself the hardest target in the room, not an impossible one. The goal is to ensure that breaching you costs more effort than an attacker is willing to spend.

Two-factor authentication is still worth having. But treating it as a finished solution is what gets people hurt.

Sources:

FBI IC3 / Viking Cloud
Wikipedia (SIM swap attack)
PhishLabs (Princeton SIM swap study)
2022 State of Passwordless Security (via HYPR)

The One Security Setting Most People Never Turn On

A friend of mine — smart, careful, not the type to click on weird links — had her email account taken over last year. The attacker didn't guess her password. They didn't need to. Her credentials had leaked in a breach from a site she'd forgotten she even used. They logged in from halfway around the world, reset her banking password, and were done before she woke up.

Her password was fine. That wasn't the problem.

The problem was that a correct password was the only thing standing between a stranger and her entire digital life. And that's true for most people reading this right now.

The Setting Is Two-Factor Authentication — And You've Probably Dismissed It Already

Yes, you've heard of it. That doesn't mean you've turned it on everywhere that matters. Most people enable it on their bank and call it done, leaving their email, cloud storage, and social accounts wide open with password-only protection.

Here's why that's the wrong call: your email isn't just your email. It's the master key. Every "forgot my password?" link on every other site goes there. If someone owns your inbox, they own everything attached to it.

According to Google's Security Blog, simply adding a recovery phone number to a Google account blocks 100% of automated bot attacks and 99% of bulk phishing attacks. Two-factor authentication takes that protection further.

What It Actually Does (Without the Jargon)

When you log in somewhere, you currently prove who you are with one thing: something you know (your password). Two-factor authentication adds a second proof: something you have — usually your phone.

Even if a thief gets your password perfectly right, they're stopped cold without that second factor. The login just… fails. They're locked out, and you get an alert that someone tried.

It takes about three minutes to set up. You'll do it once and then barely notice it exists.

The Part Most Articles Get Wrong

Here's the counterintuitive thing almost nobody tells you: not all two-factor methods are equal, and the most popular one is also the weakest.

SMS text message codes — the "we just texted you a 6-digit code" approach — are better than nothing, but they have a real vulnerability called SIM swapping. An attacker calls your phone carrier, pretends to be you, and convinces them to transfer your number to a SIM card the attacker controls. Now those texts go to them.

According to the Federal Trade Commission, SIM swap scams have cost victims millions of dollars, often targeting people who thought they were protected by two-factor SMS.

The fix is to use an authenticator app instead of text messages. Google Authenticator, Authy, and Apple's built-in password manager all generate codes locally on your device, with no carrier involved. There's nothing to intercept. This is free, takes five extra minutes to set up versus SMS, and is dramatically more secure.

Where to Turn It On First

Not every account deserves the same urgency. Prioritize in this order:

Your primary email account — Gmail, Outlook, Apple Mail. This is non-negotiable.
Your password manager, if you use one. If someone gets in here, they get everything.
Your phone carrier account itself — because of the SIM swap risk above.
Financial accounts — bank, brokerage, PayPal, Venmo.
Social media, especially if your accounts have large followings or are connected to business tools.

For each one: go to Settings → Security (or Privacy) → Two-Factor Authentication. Enable it. When given a choice, pick "Authenticator App" over "Text Message." Scan the QR code with your authenticator app. Done.

The Backup Codes Are Not Optional

Every service that offers two-factor will also give you a set of backup codes — a list of one-time-use numbers you can use if you lose your phone. Most people screenshot them, close the tab, and never think about them again.

Print them. Physically. Put them somewhere you'd look if your phone was stolen — a filing cabinet, a locked drawer, your wallet. This sounds paranoid until the day your phone dies overseas and you need to get into your email. A printed backup code is not paranoia; it's basic contingency planning.

The Honest Limitation

Two-factor authentication is not a magic shield. A sophisticated, targeted phishing attack can still defeat it — if you're tricked into typing both your password and your code into a fake site, the attacker can use both in real time before the code expires. This is called a real-time phishing relay, and it's happening more than most people realize.

The more durable solution is a physical security key (like a YubiKey), which is hardware-based and cryptographically tied to the actual website's domain — fakes can't use it. But that costs money and requires more setup, which puts it out of reach for casual users.

So: two-factor authentication via an authenticator app is the right move for almost everyone. It stops the vast majority of attacks. It just doesn't stop all of them. If you're a high-value target — journalist, activist, executive — the threat model is different and you should dig deeper.

For everyone else: turn it on today, use an app instead of texts, save your backup codes somewhere physical. That's it. You've just made yourself dramatically harder to compromise than 90% of people around you.

Sources:

Google Security Blog
Federal Trade Commission (SIM Swap Scams)

What Happens To Your Data After A Company Gets Hacked

A few years ago, a friend of mine got a call from her bank about a fraudulent charge — $12.99 for a streaming service she'd never heard of. Small, easy to dispute. But it kicked off three months of chaos: a replacement card, a drained savings account linked to the old one, and eventually the discovery that her email address and password had been sold in a batch of 200 million credentials from a breach she had no idea she was part of.

The company that got hacked? They never told her.

The first 48 hours nobody talks about

When a company gets breached, the clock that matters isn't the one they're using to notify you. It's the one the attacker started the moment they got in.

Most breaches aren't discovered the day they happen. According to IBM's Cost of a Data Breach Report, the average time to identify and contain a breach is around 258 days. That's eight months of your data potentially circulating before anyone sends you a "we take your privacy seriously" email.

In that window, here's what actually happens to your stolen data: it usually doesn't get used immediately. Attackers often sit on fresh data or sell it in bulk to brokers who specialize in sorting and validating it. Your email and password get tested against dozens of other sites automatically — a process called credential stuffing — before anything flashy happens.

Your data has a market price. It's probably lower than you think.

This is the counterintuitive part most breach articles skip: your individual data isn't worth much.

A full identity profile — name, SSN, date of birth, address — sells for roughly $10 to $25 on dark web markets, sometimes less if it's old or from an oversaturated breach. Your credit card number with CVV might fetch $5. According to Privacy Affairs' Dark Web Price Index, hacked social media accounts often sell for under $50.

What this means for you is that the threat isn't usually a targeted criminal who wants you specifically. It's automation — scripts running your credentials against thousands of sites at once, or bots probing for accounts tied to valuable services like cryptocurrency exchanges or airline miles.

Your data is commodity, not target. That changes what you should actually worry about.

The real danger is the chain reaction

The breach itself isn't the problem. The chain reaction it enables is.

Say your email and an old password leaked from a forum you signed up for in 2017 and forgot about. If that password is anywhere close to what you use now — same base word, different number at the end — automated tools will figure that out. They're built for it.

From your email, an attacker can trigger "forgot password" flows on your other accounts. From your other accounts, they can find financial information, real address data, or access to connected services. This is why the forum breach that seems irrelevant can become the thread that unravels everything.

What you should actually do, step by step

Stop thinking in terms of "was I in the breach" and start thinking about blast radius.

First, go to HaveIBeenPwned.com right now and enter your email. This site, maintained by security researcher Troy Hunt, indexes breach data and tells you specifically which data sets your email appeared in. It's free and doesn't store your search.

If you're in one, here's the sequence that actually matters:

Change the password on that breached account — but only after you've changed your email account's password first. Email is the master key.
Turn on two-factor authentication on your email, using an authenticator app (not SMS if you can avoid it — SIM swapping is a real attack).
Search your inbox for the word "welcome" to surface every service you've ever signed up for. Change credentials for anything financial or health-related immediately.
Freeze your credit at all three bureaus — Equifax, Experian, TransUnion. This is free and blocks anyone from opening new credit lines in your name. Unfreeze only when you need to apply for something, then refreeze.

A credit freeze is the one action that actually stops new-account fraud cold. Almost nobody does it until after something bad happens.

The notification you receive is not for your benefit

When a company sends you a breach notification email, it often arrives weeks or months after the incident. Legal teams have reviewed every word. The language is calibrated to minimize liability, not maximize your ability to respond quickly.

According to the Identity Theft Resource Center, many breach notices omit key details — like what specific fields were exposed, whether passwords were hashed or stored in plain text, or how long the breach window lasted. You are often getting the legally minimum viable disclosure.

Read the notification for what they don't say as much as what they do. "Encrypted passwords" with no mention of hashing algorithm means you don't actually know how exposed you are. "No financial data was accessed" sometimes means financial data wasn't stored there — not that it wasn't sought.

The honest caveat

None of this fully protects you, and pretending otherwise would be dishonest.

If a company stores your data in plain text, or gets breached by a sophisticated state-level actor, or if you've used the same password across accounts for years — there's no single action that reverses that exposure. The freeze helps. The password manager helps. The 2FA helps. But some of the data from old breaches is already out there, indexed, and will be for a long time.

What you're doing when you take these steps isn't eliminating risk. You're making yourself a harder target than the next person. In a world of automated, bulk attacks, that's often enough.

Sources:

IBM Security
Privacy Affairs
Identity Theft Resource Center

How Hackers Get Into Accounts Without Knowing Your Password

Your friend texts you at 2am: "Did you just send me a weird link?" You didn't. But your Instagram account did — to everyone you follow. You log in and your email has been changed. Your password was never touched. The hacker didn't need it.

This happens constantly, and most security advice completely misses why.

The Session Cookie Trick Nobody Talks About

When you log into any website, the site hands your browser a small file called a session cookie. Think of it as a temporary wristband at a concert — proof you already paid, so staff don't make you show your ticket again. The site stops caring about your password the moment that wristband exists.

If someone steals that cookie file from your computer, they paste it into their own browser and walk straight into your account. No password needed. No two-factor code needed. The site thinks they are you, because as far as it can tell, they have your wristband.

This isn't theoretical. According to Google's Threat Analysis Group, a wave of attacks against YouTube creators used exactly this method — malware delivered through fake sponsorship emails stole session cookies and hijacked channels with hundreds of thousands of subscribers, all without cracking a single password.

The malware required nothing more than the creator opening a PDF.

OAuth: When Trusting an App Becomes a Backdoor

You've seen the button: "Sign in with Google" or "Connect with Facebook." This system, called OAuth, is genuinely convenient. You're not giving the third-party app your password — you're giving it a permission token, like handing someone a key that only opens the front door but not the safe.

Here's the problem. Most people click "Allow" without reading what permissions they're granting. Some apps request the ability to read your email, send messages on your behalf, or access contacts. Once you've clicked Allow, the app has that power indefinitely — even if you forget it exists.

Attackers exploit this by building fake-but-functional apps (a "free PDF converter," a "follower checker") that request sweeping permissions. You use it once, forget about it, and months later the attacker uses that still-active permission to harvest your data or send phishing messages to your contacts.

Go to your Google account right now: myaccount.google.com/permissions. Count how many connected apps you don't recognize. Revoke anything you don't actively use.

SIM Swapping: When Your Phone Number Betrays You

Here's the counterintuitive part most articles skip entirely: your phone number is often weaker security than no second factor at all, because it creates a single point of failure that attackers can social-engineer away from you.

A SIM swap attack works like this — a criminal calls your mobile carrier, pretends to be you, claims they got a new phone, and asks for your number to be transferred to their SIM card. If the customer service rep is having a bad day, or the attacker has purchased enough of your personal data from a previous breach to answer security questions convincingly, the number moves. Every SMS two-factor code now goes to them.

According to the FBI's 2023 Internet Crime Report, SIM swapping attacks resulted in over $48 million in losses that year — and that's only what was reported.

The fix is specific: call your carrier and ask them to add a "port freeze" or account PIN that requires in-store ID to change. Most carriers offer this. Almost nobody does it.

What You Should Actually Do

Forget the vague "use strong passwords" advice. Here's what targets the specific attacks above:

For session cookies: Keep your browser extensions minimal. Extensions can read your cookies. An extension with 50,000 downloads and a 4-star rating can still be malicious — it only needs to turn malicious after it's built trust. Audit your extensions every few months and remove anything you don't remember installing.

For OAuth tokens: Set a calendar reminder for every six months to review connected apps across Google, Facebook, Twitter/X, and Microsoft. Revoke everything that isn't essential. This takes ten minutes and closes back doors you probably forgot you opened.

For SIM swapping: Switch your two-factor method from SMS to an authenticator app (Google Authenticator, Authy, or a hardware key like a YubiKey). Authenticator app codes live on your device — they can't be redirected by swapping a SIM card.

One more thing: sign-in activity logs exist in most major platforms. Gmail has it at the bottom of your inbox ("Last account activity"). Check it. Real account compromises often show logins from countries you've never visited, and those logs sit there unread until it's too late.

The Honest Limitation

None of this is foolproof. A sufficiently motivated, well-resourced attacker — the kind who targets executives, journalists, or activists — has tools that circumvent even good hygiene. Zero-day browser exploits can steal cookies before any extension scanner catches them. Nation-state actors can sometimes pressure carriers directly.

Security isn't a lock you install once. It's a habit of making yourself a harder target than the person next to you. That's an uncomfortable truth, but it's the accurate one.

Sources:

Google Threat Analysis Group
FBI 2023 Internet Crime Report
Google Connected Apps

Your Phone Is Listening — But That Is Not Even The Scary Part

My friend Sara mentioned offhand that she needed to replace her kitchen faucet. She did not search for it. She did not text anyone about it. She said it out loud, in her kitchen, while her phone sat on the counter. Two hours later, a Delta faucet ad appeared in her Instagram feed.

She called me, half-laughing, half-freaked out. "My phone is definitely listening to me."

I had to tell her the truth, which turned out to be far more unsettling than the conspiracy theory she already believed.

The Listening Thing Is Real — But Overblown

Your phone almost certainly is not recording your faucet conversations and shipping them to a marketing team. The data bandwidth alone makes it technically implausible — a phone continuously streaming audio would drain your battery in hours and spike your data usage in ways security researchers would have detected long ago.

But in late 2023, something interesting slipped out. A marketing team within media giant Cox Media Group claimed it had the capability to listen to ambient conversations through embedded microphones in smartphones, smart TVs, and other devices to gather data for targeted advertising, in a program it called "Active Listening." Google, Meta, and Amazon all publicly distanced themselves from CMG. The pitch materials were quietly deleted.

Whether or not CMG's "Active Listening" product actually worked as advertised is almost beside the point. What matters is what their pitch revealed about the appetite in the advertising industry for this kind of access — and why they thought they could get away with calling it legal.

CMG claimed in their since-deleted blog post that active listening is legal because users agree to it in the fine print of app terms of service. Think about that. The consent you gave to a weather app or a free flashlight utility may have included a clause permitting someone to listen to you in your kitchen.

The Thing That Is Actually Terrifying

Here is what the faucet story gets wrong: Sara's phone did not need to hear her say "faucet." It already knew.

It knew she had been spending more time at home than usual. It knew her neighborhood, her income bracket, the age of her house based on her GPS history. It knew she had been visiting home improvement websites — maybe she searched for grout cleaner three weeks ago, and that data got combined with her location patterns and her demographic profile and her household composition, and an algorithm concluded she was in a home-maintenance mindset.

This is what the data broker industry actually does, and it is vastly more sophisticated and invasive than a microphone.

Data broker companies Gravy Analytics and Venntel claimed to collect and process more than 17 billion location signals from around a billion mobile devices every single day. That is not a typo. Seventeen billion. Daily. And that data — which tracked people to medical clinics, places of religious worship, domestic abuse shelters, and political rallies — was then sold to advertisers, analytics firms, and private government contractors.

The Federal Trade Commission took action against both companies in December 2024, as well as against another data broker, Mobilewalla. The FTC's complaint alleged that Mobilewalla collected more than 500 million unique consumer advertising identifiers paired with precise location data, which was not anonymized — and the company sold that raw data to third parties including advertisers, other data brokers, and analytics firms.

Nobody told you this was happening. You did not consent to it in any meaningful way. It was buried in the terms of a random app you installed in 2019 and forgot about.

The Counterintuitive Part Most Articles Miss

Everyone focuses on the microphone. Nobody talks about the real-time bidding system.

Every time a webpage or app loads an ad, there is a tiny auction happening in milliseconds. Publishers send your device information — including your location, browsing behavior, and device identifiers — to hundreds of potential advertisers so they can bid to show you an ad. It is called real-time bidding, and here is the part that should genuinely disturb you: companies can participate in those auctions, lose the bid, and still keep your data.

According to the FTC, there are few if any technical controls in place to ensure that advertisers who are bidding do not retain data in unintended ways — and the FTC found that Mobilewalla retained data from auctions it did not even win, which is prohibited by RTB exchange rules.

So the moment a webpage loads on your phone, your location data can be harvested by dozens of companies you have never heard of, who were not even the ones showing you the ad. This happens thousands of times a day.

That is why Sara saw the faucet ad. Not because anyone was listening. Because the surveillance infrastructure already knew everything it needed to know.

What You Can Actually Do

This is where most articles hand you a list of generic tips. I will skip that and tell you what actually matters.

Reset your advertising ID. Both iPhone and Android assign your phone a unique advertising identifier that data brokers use to track you across apps and websites. On iPhone, go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Tracking, turn off "Allow Apps to Request to Track," and under Apple Advertising turn off "Personalized Ads." On Android (settings vary by manufacturer), find "Ads" in your settings and reset the advertising ID, or on Android 12 and later, delete it entirely. This does not stop all tracking, but it severs the thread that ties your data across brokers.

Audit your location permissions. Go into your app permissions right now and check which apps have "Always On" location access. Most of them do not need it. Change anything non-essential to "While Using" or "Never." The weather app does not need to know where you are at 3am.

Use a browser that does not participate in real-time bidding. Firefox with the uBlock Origin extension blocks a significant portion of the RTB ecosystem. Safari has decent tracking protection built in. Chrome is made by the world's largest advertising company — draw your own conclusions.

Submit data broker opt-out requests. Services like DeleteMe or Privacy Bee automate this for a fee. If you want to do it manually, the major brokers — Acxiom, LexisNexis, Spokeo, and others — each have opt-out pages. It is tedious, requires verification, and they will often relist you after some time. But reducing your data broker profile does reduce the richness of your surveillance dossier.

Be skeptical of free apps. If an app is free and does not have an obvious business model, the product is you. A flashlight app that asks for microphone and location access is not a flashlight app.

The Honest Limitation

None of this will make you invisible. The data broker industry processes hundreds of billions of data points daily, and even if you opt out of every broker you can find, your data has already been bought, sold, aggregated, and resold multiple times. The FTC's enforcement actions against Gravy Analytics, Mobilewalla, and others are meaningful, but they are playing catch-up to an industry that has had a decade of unchecked growth.

You can make yourself a harder target. You cannot make yourself invisible. The infrastructure for this kind of mass surveillance was built quietly, it was funded by advertising dollars, and most of it was technically legal the whole time.

That is the part that should keep you up at night — not the microphone.

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